○. Introduction: The concept of truth and the traditional debates over the nature of truth

Unit 1 Semantic conception of truth

1.1 Tarski's semantic theory of truth

Tarski, A. (1944), ‘The semantic conception of truth’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 4 (1944), 341-76; reprinted in Semantics and the philosophy of language, L. Linsky (ed.), Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1952,13-47; also reprinted in Alfred Tarski - Collected Papers, Vol. 2: 1935-44, S. R. Givant and R. N. McKenzie (eds.), Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1986, 661-99.
----- (1969), ‘Truth and proof’, in Fundamental Problems in Philosophy, O. Haufling (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell and Mott, 1973, a revision of one of the same title originally appeared in Scientific American, vol. 6 (1969), 63-77 (reprinted in A Philosophical Companion to First-order Logic, edited with an overview by R. I. G. Hughes, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993, 101-125); reprinted in Alfred Tarski －Collected Papers, Vol. 4: 1958-79, S. R. Givant and R. N. McKenzie (eds.), Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 1986, 399-423.

1.2 Hartry Field on Tarski's semantic conception of truth

Field, H. (1972/[2001]), ‘Tarski's theory of truth’, The Journal of Philosophy, (1972); reprinted in Reference, Truth and Reality, M. Platts (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, 83-110; also reprinted with Postscript in Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, 3-29.

1.3 Austin’s semantic account of truth

Austin, J. L (1950), ‘Truth’, Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol.24 (1950), 111-29; reprinted in Truth, G. Pitcher (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon, 1964, 18-31; also reprinted in Truth, S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 149-61.
Strawson, P. F. (1950), ‘Truth’, Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 24 (1950), 129-56; reprinted in G. Pitcher (ed.) Truth, Oxford: Clarendon, 1964; also reprinted in Truth, S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 162-82.
Unit 2 The insubstantiality of truth

2.1 Redundancy theory of truth

Frege, G. (1915), ‘My basic logical insights’, in Posthumous Writings, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulbach (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979, 251-2.
Ramsey, F. P. (1927), ‘Fact and propositions’, reprinted in Foundation, ed. by D. H. Mellor, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, 40-57, especially, pp. 44-5.
Sluga, H. (1980), Gottlob Frege, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 112-7.
Prior, A. N. (1971), Objects of Thought, edited by P. T. Geach and A. F. P. Kenny, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971, pp. 11-13, 24-26, also 98-101.
Hugly, P., and C. Sayward (1996), ‘Prior on truth－A first look’, Chapter 3 of Intensionality and Truth- An Essay on the Philosophy of A. N. Prior, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996.
Wittgenstein, L., ‘Philosophical extracts’, reprinted in Truth, S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 108-114.

2.2 Quine’s disquotational account of truth and semantic ascent

Quine, W. V. (1992), ‘Truth’, in Pursuit of Truth, Second edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 77-102.
----- (1986), Philosophy of Logic, §1.5: Truth and Semantic Ascent, second edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986, 10-13.
----- (1960), Word and Object, § 56 Semantic Ascent, Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 270-76.

2.3 Deflationism－minimal theory of truth

Horwich, P. (1999), ‘The minimalist conception of truth’, in Truth, S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 239-263; a revised version of the postscript to the second edition of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Unit 3 Truth and the liar paradox

3.1 Parson’s contextual theory

Parsons, C. (1974), ‘The liar paradox’, The Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3 (1974), 381-412; reprinted in Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin, ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, 9-45.

3.2 Kripe’s solution

Kripke, S. (1975), ‘Outline of a theory of truth’, The Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 690-716; reprinted in Martin (1984), 53-81.


3.3 Gupta’s revision theory

Gupta, A. (2001), ‘Truth’, in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, L. Goble (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 90-114.

Unit 4 The Anti-realist Challenge and Davidson’s programme

4.1 Dummett’s anti-realist's programme

Dummett, M. (1959), ‘Truth’, reprinted in Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth, 1978, 1-24.

4.2 Davidson’s theory of truth and knowledge

Davidson, D. (1986/[2001c]), ‘A coherence theory of truth and knowledge’, in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, E. LePore (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 307-319; reprinted in Davidson (2001c) [Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford: Clarendon Press], 137- 153, Afterthought is affixed, pp. 154-7.

4.3 Davidson’s primitivist theory of truth

Davidson, D. (1996/[2005)), ‘The folly of trying to define truth’, Journal of Philosophy, 93/6 (1996), 263-78; reprinted in Truth, S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 308-22; reprinted in Davidson (2005) [Truth, Language and History, Oxford: Clarendon Press], 19-37.
----- (1999), ‘The centrality of truth’, in Truth and its Nature (If Any), J. Peregrin (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, 105-115.